U.S. Naval War College

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
CMSI China Maritime Reports

China Maritime Studies Institute

5-2022

China Maritime Report No. 21: Civilian Shipping and Maritime
Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion
Lonnie D. Henley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports

ift
00 ffij$i)f �ffl
China Maritime Studies Institute

China Maritime Report No. 21

Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia
The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion
Lonnie D. Henley

May 2022

Seagoing civilian cargo ships are an important component of the large-scale combat
power projection system.
––Zhang Jian and Wu Juan, Army Military Transportation Academy, 20171
Summary
Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to
transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report
challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements
by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵).
Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the
national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained
militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data
management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties
associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good
enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.
Introduction
Discussion of a potential Chinese military invasion of Taiwan almost always hinges on whether the
PLA has enough lift capacity to deliver the would-be invasion forces across the Taiwan Strait and, to
a lesser extent, whether it could sustain them once they are ashore on Taiwan. The argument centers
on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious landing ships and other over-the-shore
amphibious assault assets, with most observers concluding that the PLAN has not built enough of
these ships and therefore that the PLA cannot (yet?) carry out a full-scale invasion.
This report argues that the PLA plans to rely heavily on mobilized maritime militia forces operating
requisitioned civilian shipping as the logistical backbone of a cross-strait landing operation, including
both the delivery of PLA forces onto Taiwan and logistical sustainment for the PLAN fleet at sea and
ground forces ashore. Moreover, the PLA does not regard civilian shipping as a stopgap measure
until more PLAN amphibious shipping can be built, but as a central feature of its preferred approach.
The report will examine China’s extensive system for preparing and generating this support force, the
roles it will undertake in an invasion operation, and the challenges that must be overcome if the plan
is to succeed.

The Scope of the Problem
Most authors looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the PLA cannot land
enough forces on Taiwan to make an invasion viable, that it will not reach that capability until it
builds many more amphibious landing ships, and that doing so will take at least several years even if
they accelerate their efforts.2 There has been little detailed analysis to underpin that judgment, at least
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not in open sources, but most observers assess that the PLA would need to land 300,000 or more
troops on Taiwan in total and that the PLAN amphibious fleet can only land around one division,
roughly 20,000 troops, in a single lift.3 Since these constraints seem obvious, the logical conclusion
is that the PLA must judge itself not yet capable of invading Taiwan.4
The PLA’s prospects appear even worse when one considers the rest of the logistical and operational
requirements for a major landing operation, beyond the formidable challenge of getting enough
troops ashore quickly in the face of determined resistance. The PLAN auxiliary fleet is inadequate to
sustain large-scale combat operations, even if those operations were close to China’s shores as a
Taiwan conflict would be. The PLAN has enlisted hundreds of civilian vessels to perform tasks
ranging from over-the-shore logistics to at-sea replenishment, emergency repair and towing, medical
support, casualty evacuation, and combat search and rescue, suggesting that its own inventory of
support ships falls far short of what it deems necessary for a landing campaign.5 Skeptics will argue
that this is more proof that the PLA itself does not take the invasion option seriously. The contrary
view presented here is that the PLA does take these requirements seriously, but that it intends to rely
on maritime militia support for large-scale combat operations, and specifically for a Taiwan invasion
campaign.
The maritime militia (海上民兵) has attracted considerable attention in the past decade, led by the
efforts of Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy at the U.S. Naval War College, focused mainly on
its role in supporting China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.6 Kevin McCauley
and Conor Kennedy have also looked at the role of civilian ships in military power projection outside
East Asia.7
What has received much less Western attention is the maritime militia’s role in large-scale combat
operations, despite Chinese authors having written extensively on it since the PLA began serious
consideration of a Taiwan invasion in the early 2000s. The Nanjing Military Region Mobilization
Department director Guo Suqing observed in 2004 that a cross-strait island landing campaign would
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require large amounts of civilian shipping.8 He noted that there were many suitable ships available,
some of which had already been retrofitted for wartime use, but warned that “the traditional form of
last-minute non-rigorous civilian ship mobilization can no longer meet the needs of large-scale crosssea landing operations.” Wang Hewen of the former General Logistics Department’s Institute of
Military Transportation noted that efforts to strengthen the retrofitting of civilian vessels for military
use had accelerated in 2003,9 and a 2004 article from the Shanghai Transportation War Preparedness
Office outlined the retrofitting work underway there.10 In 2004, Zhou Xiaoping of the Naval
Command College called for overhaul of the mobilization system, arguing that “if the traditional
administrative order-style mobilization and requisition methods were still followed, it would be
difficult to ensure the implementation of civilian ship preparation and mobilization.”11 The
government and PLA acted on these concerns, and over the past twenty years the maritime militia
has evolved into a major force multiplier for the PLAN in large-scale combat operations.

Exhibit 1. PLA forces train with vessels owned by the Bohai Ferry Group.12
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Operational Roles for the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan Invasion
Kennedy and Erickson have written at length on the militia’s peacetime mission to assert China’s
maritime claims, centered on fishing boats that may or may not do any actual fishing. The militia
forces discussed here are very different, encompassing large-capacity commercial vessels including
container ships, general cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers, roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) ferries, barges,
semisubmersibles, ocean-going tugboats, passenger ships, “engineering ships,” and others, as well as
smaller vessels.13 Authors from the Army Military Transportation University noted in 2015 that the
force consisted of over 5,000 ships organized into 89 militia transportation units, 53 waterway
engineering units, and 143 units with other specializations.14
Unlike the U.S. Merchant Marine model, where government officers and crews take control of leased
ships, Chinese maritime militia units are composed mostly of the regular crews of the mobilized
ships, what the Central Military Commission (CMC) Militia and Reserve Bureau director called the
“model of selecting militiamen according to their ship” (依船定兵模式).15 The close correlation
between requisitioned ships and militia units is essential for integration into military operations.
There need to be clear command relationships with the supported PLA units, and the crews need to
be trained on their operational tasks, not to mention the increasingly important issue of legal rights
and obligations in wartime. Local or provincial mobilization officials negotiate the requisitioning
terms with the ship owners, either large shipping companies or individual owners, while the crews
are inducted into militia units by a process that is not explained very clearly in the available writings.
Several articles note that some militiamen are not enthusiastic about their role.16
PLA sources cite a wide range of wartime functions for the maritime militia. In a Taiwan invasion
scenario, they include the following:
Delivery of forces. The most obvious operational role for militia units is to carry forces to the
battlefield, referred to as “military unit transportation and delivery” (部队运输投送). PLA sources
list this as a primary role for civilian shipping, to include participating in the assault landing phase of
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the operation.17 There are several delivery modes contemplated, the most straightforward being
through existing ports. A 2019 article on amphibious heavy combined arms brigades in cross-strait
island landing operations noted that as part of the first echelon ashore, one of their most important
tasks was to create the conditions for second echelon units to land through operations such as the
seizure of ports and piers.18 Articles published in 2014 and 2019 on amphibious landing bases made
the same point and included rapid repair of piers among the main tasks to help the second echelon get
ashore.19 Other landing modes include lightering from cargo ships to shallow-draft vessels;
semisubmersible vessels delivering amphibious vehicles or air-cushion landing craft;20 and RO-RO
ships delivering amphibious forces to their launching point or directly to shore.21
At-sea support. The PLAN has only a few replenishment ships, not enough to sustain the
huge number of vessels that would be involved in a cross-strait invasion.22 Given the relatively short
distances for a Taiwan landing, most PLAN ships would likely rely on shore-based support, but the
service envisions using militia ships for at-sea replenishment as well, including fuel tankers and
cargo ships fitted with equipment for alongside replenishment and helipads for vertical resupply. 23
Militia ships would also provide emergency services including towing, rapid repair, firefighting,
search and rescue, technical support, and even personnel augmentation to replace casualties aboard
navy ships.24
Over-the-shore logistical support. A discussion of logistical support in island landing
operations noted the importance of fuel tankers laying pipelines to support forces ashore.25 The
author did not specify maritime militia in this role, but given the prominence of tankers in other
17
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discussions of militia support, it seems likely they would take part in this activity as well.
Requisitioned cargo ships will also play a major role in logistical support through captured ports or
via lighters and barges to expedient floating docks.
Medical support. The PLAN’s fleet of hospital ships could be overwhelmed by the casualties
involved in a major landing operation. Militia would augment this force with containerized medical
modules deployed on a variety of commercial ships, as well as smaller vessels providing casualty
evacuation and first aid.26
Obstacle emplacement and clearing. Several sources list emplacing and clearing mines and
other obstacles among maritime militia tasks in a landing operation, without providing much further
detail.27
Engineering support. Maritime militia forces will not be passively waiting for first echelon
units to open damaged ports. Tugboats, barges, salvage ships, crane ships, and dredgers will join the
effort to clear obstacles, open channels, and repair docks and other facilities.28
Reconnaissance, surveillance, and early warning. While much of this discussion has focused
on large ships, the huge fleet of militia fishing boats would have a large role in a Taiwan operation as
well, providing eyes and ears across the entire maritime theater.29
Deception and concealment. One major advantage the PLAN derives from having hundreds
of militia ships in the battlespace is the ability to hide its most valuable platforms among the radar
clutter. Many sources list deception, camouflage, and feints among the militia’s tasks. One 2018
article explains that militia ships will “use corner reflectors, false radio signals, false heat sources,
etc., to set up counterfeit ships, missiles, fighters and other targets on the sea … to cause the enemy
to make wrong judgments and lure the enemy into attacking the false target.”30 Flooding the strait
with false targets would severely complicate Blue efforts against the invasion fleet.
Helicopter relay platform. The Taiwan Strait is relatively narrow, but a two-hundred-mile
round trip each sortie still creates a significant strain for helicopter operations. Some militia ships
will serve as “helicopter relay support platforms” (直升机中继保障平台), fitted with helipads,

26
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ammunition storage compartments, aviation fuel bladders and refueling equipment, limited repair
facilities, and flight control support systems to keep the helicopters in the fight. 31

Exhibit 2. Maritime militia members based in Xiashan District (Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province) receive training on fuel
supply logistics.32

Maritime Militia Force Development
The NDMC system. Preparing maritime militia forces to operate civilian ships in wartime is a
large, complex endeavor involving many parts of Chinese government and military systems. The
effort is coordinated through National Defense Mobilization Committees (NDMCs) at the national,
provincial, municipal, and county levels. The national-level body styles itself in English as the State
Commission for National Defense Mobilization (国家国防动员委员会), referred to hereafter as
SCNDM to distinguish it from NDMCs at lower levels. In 2016, Premier of the People’s Republic of
China Li Keqiang was its director and its two deputy directors were Secretary-General of the State
Council Yang Jing and Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan, listed in that order.33 A long
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list of agencies are represented on the committee (see Exhibit 3). It seems very likely that the makeup
of lower-level NDMCs reflects that of the SCNDM; certainly, the Gansu NDMC’s does. 34
The broad membership roster highlights two important facts about NDMCs. First, national defense
mobilization is primarily a governmental function, not a military function. Several actions over the
past six years have strengthened CMC control over the military side of national defense mobilization,
most notably the promotion of the previous General Staff Department Mobilization Department to a
separate top-level department of the CMC in 2015.35 Some observers interpret recent changes to the
National Defense Law as giving the CMC authority over the entire process, but this is a fundamental
misunderstanding.36 The PLA is the customer for mobilized resources, establishing requirements that
other departments fulfill under the leadership and authority of the government. The Premier heads the
SCNDM and governors or mayors head NMDCs at lower levels.37

省委、省政府、省军区决定成立甘肃省国防动员委员会 [“The Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial
Government, and the Provincial Military Region Decided to Establish the Gansu Provincial National Defense Mobilization
Committee”], 甘肃省 [Gansu Province Website], July 7, 2020,
http://www.gansu.gov.cn:8443/art/2020/7/7/art_11169_16719.html [accessed March 2021].
35
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Exhibit 3. SCNDM Membership (2016)38

State Commission for National Defense Mobilization (2016)
Director Li Keqiang
Deputy Director Yang Jing
Deputy Director Chang Wanquan
Secretary-General Sheng Bin
Member organizations
•

Relevant departments of the Central Military
Commission

•

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development

•

CCP Central Organization Department

•

Ministry of Transport

•

National Development and Reform Commission

•

Ministry of Commerce

•

Ministry of Education

•

Ministry of Culture

•

Ministry of Science and Technology

•

Health and Family Planning Commission

•

Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology

•

State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission

•

Ministry of Public Security

•

State Administration of Press, Publications,
Radio, Film, and Television

•

Ministry of Civil Affairs

•

State Statistics Bureau

•

Ministry of Justice

•

All-China Federation of Trade Unions

•

Ministry of Finance

•

Central Committee of the Communist Youth
League

•

Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security

•

All-China Women’s Federation

•

Ministry of Land and Resources

Second, NDMCs are coordinating bodies lacking administrative authority of their own. An article
from Hubei province emphasizes that the provincial NDMC is responsible for organizing, guiding,
and coordinating national defense mobilization, while the people’s government is responsible for
implementation.39 An author noted in 2013 that because all the agencies carrying out mobilization
fall under the bureaucratic purview of the National Planning Commission system (计委系统) rather

38

“State Commission for National Defense Mobilization”

39

湖北省民用运力国防动员办法 [Measures for National Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Capacity in Hubei

Province], 河北省人民政府 [People's Government of Hubei Province], June 23, 2013,
www.hubei.gov.cn/zfwj/szfl/201307/t20130705_1711145.shtml.
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than the military system, “the military basically is not involved, and it is difficult for local
governments to reflect military needs in a timely manner.”40
For civilian ship mobilization and maritime militia training, the key structures within the NDMC
coordination system are Transportation War Preparedness Offices (交通战备办公室) and
Transportation Mobilization Offices (交通动员办公室) from national to county level. These offices
consolidate the whole range of PLA transportation requirements and, in the case of civilian shipping,
work with government offices to develop overall approaches; identify specific ships to mobilize;
draft plans for ship requisition, retrofitting, and conversion; advise on militia organizational structure
and personnel; and develop militia training requirements.41
The Provincial Military District system. On the PLA side of this process, the key structures
are the Provincial Military Districts (省军区, PMD) and their subordinate sub-districts (军分区) at
the prefecture level. At the county level, the PMD system and the local government share joint
authority over the People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部, PAFD). The PMD system has
not received much attention from observers outside China, but it is the PLA’s interface to the entire
apparatus of civilian support to military operations.
The PMD system serves a wide range of functions, from recruitment to civil defense to representing
PLA interests within major non-defense industries. But a sub-district commander in Jiangsu asserted
in 2018 that “national defense mobilization is the PMD system’s primary responsibility” (国防动员
工作，是省军区系统的主责主业).42 PMD Mobilization Departments represent the PLA in the
provincial NDMCs, serving as the conduit for operational forces to articulate support requirements.
The PMDs man, equip, organize, and train militia units and exercise direct command of the militia in
peacetime.
Maritime militia training. If civilian shipping is to participate effectively in large-scale
combat operations (and survive the experience), the crews must learn a range of military skills in
addition to their basic navigation and boat-handling abilities. Training topics include PLA command
relationships and coordination processes; marshalling, assembly, and sailing in formation; use of
military communications equipment and procedures; self-defense and mutual defense; rescue and
first aid; military loading and unloading techniques; basic knowledge of the operating environment
from a military perspective; operation of equipment particular to their assigned support tasks;
knowledge about their supported unit and their role in that unit’s mission; knowledge about enemy
threats they will face; and topics such as “dockless unloading” (无码头卸载).43 The National
40

郭辽、宋云霞、赵福林 [Guo Liao, Song Yunxia, and Zhao Fulin], 浅析民船动员中的法律问题及对策 [“Analysis on

the Legal Problems and Countermeasures in the Mobilization of Civilian Ships”], 政工学刊 [Political Science Journal],
no. 7 (July 2013), 46-47.
41

何国本、邹伟、鲍文华、陈龙 [He Guoben, Zou Wei, Bao Wenhua, and Chen Long], 战略投送支援船队训练现状

及对策 [“Current Situation and Responses for Strategic Projection Support Fleet Training”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal
of Military Transportation University], 19 no. 5 (May 2017), 1-4; Zhang and Wu, “Mobilization and Employment of
Seagoing Civilian Cargo Ships,” 1-5, 45.
42

徐国安 [Xu Guo’an], 加强国防动员建设的几点思考 [“Some Thoughts on Strengthening the Construction of National

Defense Mobilization”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 12 (December 2018), 55-57.
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Transportation War Preparedness Office issued an Outline for Training and Evaluation of National
Defense Transportation Specialized Support Teams 《国防交通专业保障队伍训练与考核大纲》in
2015. This regulation specifies military training requirements for all militia transportation support
units, including highway, air, and rail as well as maritime units, but like most such Outlines, it does
not appear to be available publicly.44
Retrofitting, conversion, and construction. Outfitting a civilian ship for military operations is
a major task. Ships need mounts and interfaces for specialized military equipment, from radios to
underway replenishment apparatus to berthing and life support for transported soldiers. They may
need stronger hulls and decks than their commercial tasks require and tie-down points for heavy
military equipment. Their assigned military mission may require specialized fittings for
reconnaissance and surveillance gear, medical treatment facilities, firefighting gear, and emergency
repair facilities. The most efficient approach is to address these requirements in the design and
shipbuilding process. China touted its first civilian RO-RO ship built to military specifications in
1997.45 Second best is to identify specific ships, make contractual arrangements with the owner, and
retrofit them with the equipment and interfaces they need. The National Transportation War
Preparedness Office issued regulatory guidance for the retrofit and conversion process in 2015: the
Technical Standards for Implementing National Defense Requirements in New Construction of
Civilian Ships 《新造民船贯彻国防要求技术标准》 and the Technical Requirements for
Modifying Civilian Ships for Military Transportation 《民船军运改装技术要求》.46 The process is
managed at the local level by “civilian ship retrofitting and conversion centers” (民船加(改)装动员
中心) under the joint supervision of the local Maritime Affairs Department and PAFD.47

Gan], [“Military Application Training and Employment Management for Civilian Cargo Ships”], 军事交通学院学报
[Journal of Military Transportation Academy], 19 no. 10 (October 2017), 20-23; Chen, “Thoughts on Strengthening the
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军⽤物资装备⽔路集装箱运输 [“Equipment for Unloading Sea Containers Carrying Military Materiel and Armament
without Terminals”], 集装箱化 [Containerization], 29 no. 10 (October 2018), 6-9.
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CNA Occasional paper DOP-2021-U-030643-Final (Arlington, VA: CNA, September 2021).
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Command and Control
In peacetime, maritime militia units fall under the command of the PMD system. Most units would
chop to PLA supported unit command in wartime, a principle one author called “whoever uses,
commands” (谁使用、谁指挥).48 The PMD reportedly would retain command of some units
performing wide-area functions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and early warning. 49
Several authors bemoan persistent problems in the PLA’s ability to command mobilized ships and
militia. Colonel Xu Guo’an, commander of a military sub-district in Jiangsu, complained in 2018 that
the peacetime militia suffered from “unscientific” command structure and “weak” command
functions, while the transition from peacetime to wartime command relations suffered from
cumbersome communication and slow processes, incompatible with the need to rapidly mobilize
forces for informatized warfare.50 Faculty members from the Navy Logistics College noted in 2017
that the commanders of militia units are militiamen themselves, part-timers often lacking systematic
military training or strong command abilities. Furthermore, they said, militia training conducted with
the PLAN did not spend as much time as needed on vital tasks unfamiliar to civilian sailors, such as
sailing in formation, dockless unloading, and military communications.51 Such training seems to be
far from routine; a 2019 article praised an exercise where civilian ships transported a surface-to-air
missile (SAM) battalion on a long movement across the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea,
noting in passing that this was the first time the SAM unit had traveled by ship. 52 A remarkably frank
assessment of PLA failures in the Battle of Jinmen, 1949, cited abysmal command and control of
civilian shipping among the major causes of the fiasco, a lesson the PLA should take to heart in
future island landing operations.53

Challenges and Known Problems
A large share of PLA articles on this and other topics take the form of “problems and responses.” The
proposed solutions may never be implemented, and may not work if they were, but these articles do
provide a ready list of problems they believe they need to fix, or at least topics that the authors think
will attract attention.
Data management. Maintaining current and accurate information for thousands of ships and
tens of thousands of crewmen is a major chore, and PLA writers are unanimous that it is not being
done well enough. Deciding which ships to bring into the system or which are suited for what tasks
requires extensive information on ship type, capacity, seaworthiness, fittings, and other aspects.
Large commercial ships spend most of their time away from their home region, and just knowing
whether the vessel is even close enough to be mobilized is a challenge. Ships are bought, sold,
leased, and transferred, and notifying the home port PAFD of the change often falls through the
cracks. Crewmen gain experience, undergo training, get injured, change jobs, retire. Each individual
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has to be evaluated for political reliability as well as skill levels. Data systems are often incompatible
from one locality to another, making it difficult to aggregate data at a higher level.54
Training quality. Keeping individual militiamen trained to the proper level is also a
challenge. Like the ships they sail on, crewmen are away from their home port much of the year.
When they are home, they often seek other jobs, particularly fishermen during the annual threemonth fishing moratorium. Training curricula are often inadequate, an issue the Outline is
presumably intended to address. The quality of training equipment varies greatly, and many localities
do not have adequate facilities for training on the many topics required. Militia units do not train
often enough with the navy units they will serve under or the army units they will load, transport, and
unload.55
Finance and law. The whole mobilization system continues to grapple with China’s
incomplete transition from a command economy to a market economy. Creating a viable legal,
regulatory, and economic foundation for mobilization in the reform era has been a two-decade effort
and remains far from finished.56 The most challenging issue on the financial side is that of
compensation for the use of ships and crews—what should be compensated, at what rate, by what
part of the Chinese regime? As late as 2019, authors complained that the body of relevant laws and
regulations did not cover many situations, that the compensation standards were not clear enough,
that the compensation rates were out of date, and that the fiscal burden was not distributed
appropriately among national, provincial, and local governments.57 Moreover, there is no mechanism
for adjudicating disputes over compensation, due to the general ban on litigation against the state
under the Administrative Litigation Law.58 The pertinent laws and regulations do not include enough
cross-references. For example, as one author notes, the Military Service Law stipulates that veterans
and militiamen have priority in applying for civil service positions, but the Civil Service Law does
not, while the Military Service Law itself does not establish any penalties for militia personnel
refusing military training.59
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Foreign-flag ships. Like the rest of the global shipping industry, an ever-growing portion of
the Chinese-funded commercial fleet uses flags of convenience.60 A 2018 article by officers from the
Army Military Transportation University and the CMC Logistics Support Department assessed that
62.5 percent by tonnage of the shipping capacity controlled by Chinese entities in 2015 flew foreign
flags.61 The authors were confident that China could justify requisitioning these ships in an
emergency, despite the lack of any specific legal provision to do so, but that registering them, getting
them ready for mobilization, and getting them trained properly would be a particular challenge for
the NDMC and Transportation Mobilization Department at each level.

Conclusion
The PLA concept of operations for a cross-strait landing on Taiwan relies heavily on large numbers
of civilian ships and their crews, organized into maritime militia units under the operational
command of the supported force. The PLA has spent over two decades developing the bureaucratic
apparatus, laws, and regulations to organize, train, and manage this force. This author finds nothing
in PLA writings on this subject to suggest this is a temporary measure, filling the gap until the Navy
expands its own fleet of transports and auxiliary ships. Rather, this seems to be how Chinese leaders,
civilian and military, think the PLA should function, leveraging the enormous resources of China’s
civilian economy to support military operations.
Any landing operation of this scale would be immensely complicated, and the reliance on maritime
militia and mobilized civilian ships adds yet another layer of complexity and uncertainty.
Undoubtedly the support effort would not go as well as planners might wish, given the many
problems they already know of and the inevitable new crises that will erupt mid-fight. That does not
mean it is doomed to fail, however. Capturing enough ports and keeping them open will almost
certainly be the main challenge. If first echelon forces succeed at that, the rest of the operation has a
reasonable chance of success, at least in this author’s opinion. Either way, an attempted invasion of
Taiwan would not only be one of the most ambitious landing operations in history, it also
undoubtedly would represent the largest ever mobilization of civilian shipping to support military
operations, far outstripping Dunkirk in the number of civilian vessels and the Falklands War in
tonnage. The militia logistics backbone is vital to the success of a Taiwan invasion.
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